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Tax knowledge diffusion through individual auditor network ties:  
Evidence from China  
 
Abstract 
This study investigates whether network ties via sharing the same individual 
auditor influences the diffusion of tax avoidance knowledge. We find that firms with 
greater connection to low-tax firms through audit partners have lower effective tax rates 
(ETRs), consistent with tax avoidance knowledge being shared among firms through 
individual auditor network. The influence of audit network ties on tax avoidance at 
focal firms is stronger when partners’ tenure in low-tax firms is longer, and when 
partners have social connection with the top executives of focal firms. In addition, audit 
fees of focal firms with auditor network ties to low-tax firms are significantly higher if 
their executives are not socially connected to partners, suggesting that audit partners 
benefit from sharing the tax avoidance knowledge with clients without social ties.  
 
 
 
Key words: Network ties, audit partner, tax avoidance, school ties 
JEL codes: G32, H26, M42 
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Tax knowledge diffusion through individual auditor network ties:  
Evidence from China  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite voluminous research providing explanations for cross-sectional variation in 
corporate tax avoidance (e.g. Rego 2003; Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Chen et al. 2010; 
Dyreng et al. 2010; McGuire et al. 2012, 2014; Hasan et al. 2014; Armstrong et al. 2012, 2015), 
there is limited evidence on how tax avoidance information is diffused among firms. One 
notable exception is Brown and Drake (2014). Using board interlocks as a proxy for network 
ties, they find that knowledge about tax-savings strategies and experience implementing these 
strategies are shared among firms via their director network ties. Our study focuses on tax 
avoidance in the context of social network ties formed by shared individual auditors among 
firms.1 Specifically, we examine whether firms connected to low-tax firms through individual 
audit partner network ties, i.e., focal firms, increase their tax avoidance (i.e. achieve a lower 
effective tax rate). 
Social structure affects economic outcomes through its effects on the flow of information 
among members of the system (Granovetter 2005). Connections obtained from social networks 
function as a conduit for the transfer of information and provide access to private information 
at relatively low costs. Prior literature suggests that social networks promote the diffusion of 
new ideas and thus influence corporate behavior (e.g. Cohen et al. 2008, 2010; Hochberg et al. 
2007; Engelberg et al. 2012; Schmidt 2015; Chiu et al. 2013). Related to tax avoidance, Brown 
                                                             
1 As defined in Brown and Drake (2014, p. 483), social network ties refer to “the pattern of social relations, formal 
or informal, among members of a social system”. Following the literature, we do not distinguish tax avoidance 
(e.g., taking advantage of loopholes in tax laws, earning management) and illegal evasion (e.g., failing to report 
revenue or profit). We use ‘tax avoidance’ and ‘tax saving’ interchangeably in the paper. 
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(2011) finds that social ties via board interlocks and geographic peers influence the spread of 
a particular type of shelter use, namely adoption of corporate owned life insurance. Brown and 
Drake (2014) find that firms with greater board ties to low-tax firms are associated with more 
tax avoidance (i.e., lower Cash ETRs). Auditor network ties can facilitate information transfer 
among client portfolios due to information advantage (e.g., Aobdia 2015; Cai et al. 2016; 
Dhaliwal et al. 2016). We hypothesize that network ties of individual auditors to low-tax clients 
facilitate the learning and sharing of tax specific knowledge that can help other client firms to 
save taxes while providing auditing service.  
Prior studies report evidence that auditors that provide tax services to their clients help 
client firms to avoid taxes, presumably because of the knowledge spillover from the audit 
services (e.g., Gleason and Mills 2011; McGuire et al. 2012; Klassen et al. 2016). Different 
from these studies, we examine the role of audit partner networks in diffusing tax-related 
information while providing auditing service to clients. Auditors accumulate a considerable 
amount of information about their clients through performing the audits and through formal or 
informal communications with senior executives and they generally contract with many 
companies, which allows auditors to be the information intermediary among their portfolios of 
clients. Recent studies provide evidence that audit firms can serve as conduits for the flow of 
information in mergers and acquisitions (Dhaliwal et al. 2016; Cai et al. 2016).  
In this study, we focus on network ties among firms through sharing the same individual 
audit partner, rather than audit firm/office. This focus is because tax avoidance information is 
complex and implicit, and less likely to be transferred among individuals, even in the same 
audit office. We use the audit environment in China because the data on individual audit 
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partners are available for a long period. Moreover, the Chinese economy is generally based on 
social networks (Guanxi) and interpersonal relations, and less on arms lengths transactions than 
those in developed countries (Liu et al. 2011; Wong 2016). Hence, social connections between 
individual auditors and clients are more important in China than in other markets (Guan et al. 
2016).  
However, it is unclear whether auditor networks could help knowledge diffusion of tax 
avoidance. On the one hand, auditor network ties could be a channel through which clients 
receive knowledge on appropriate tax strategies. During the audit, audit partners have unique 
access to senior executives of their clients and acquire general information about a firm. 
Combined with information gathered during the conduct of financial reporting audits, the 
individual auditors will have a better understanding of the firms’ tax saving strategies. Further, 
they may communicate with senior executive about the tax saving strategies which may be in 
the form of “soft talk” (Dhaliwal et al. 2016). Hence, individual auditors are well suited to 
spread tax planning strategies across firms, since they are connected to multiple firms and are 
likely aware of the tax strategies being implemented by clients. In addition, audit partners may 
spread tax-avoidance knowledge while auditing their clients to foster a good relationship with 
clients or earn higher audit fees. Anecdotal evidence suggests that firms may receive tax saving 
advices from their auditors. For example, legal court documents reveal that AEP initially 
considered corporate-owned life insurance shelter (COLI) at the suggestion of their auditor, 
Deloitte, Haskins and Sells (AEP. Inc. v. U. S., 136 F. Supp. 2d 762). In China, auditors have 
the same incentive to share tax avoidance information to retain the clients due to the fierce 
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competition (Wei 2013).2  
On the other hand, there are both litigation and reputation concerns that may prevent audit 
partners from sharing tax avoidance information with clients. First, the audit partners’ 
contractual work is to provide audit service and audit opinions. They are not obligated to 
providing tax consulting to clients.3 Second, tax avoidance strategies can be risky activities and 
could be challenged by tax authorities, thus exposing the partners to litigation risk (Stice 1991; 
Krishnan and Krishnan 1997; Rego and Wilson 2012). Third, being associated with tax 
avoidance could subject the audit partner to reputational costs. The media have recently 
reported many incidences of corporate tax avoidance by firms around the world, portraying the 
practice as highly controversial. By helping clients to avoid taxes, audit partners could expose 
themselves to negative publicity and media attention. If these concerns dominate, we will not 
observe the hypothesized relation. Hence, whether audit partner network ties to low-tax firms 
encourage or discourage client firms to implement tax avoidance strategies is an empirical 
question. 
We define the individual audit partners that audit low-tax firms as connected partners. We 
find that firms with shared individual auditor network ties to low-tax firms report lower GAAP 
effective tax rates,4 consistent with our hypothesis that audit partners help diffuse tax avoidance 
                                                             
2 Private conversations with 10 audit partners (2 from Big 4 and 3 from Top 10 (non-Big 4), and the remaining 
from other audit firms) reveal that audit partners from Big 4 will not discuss tax issues in general with clients 
unless they have some kind of personal connections. In contrast, audit partners from non-Big 4 firms are more 
forthcoming in sharing tax avoidance information with client firms to maintain good relation with clients. 
3 In addition, the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct (Section 301) states that “A member in public practice 
shall not disclose any confidential client information without the specific consent of the client”. The CICPA has 
the same principles for auditors in China.  
4 Two common measures of effective tax rates are GAAP ETR and CASH ETR. In China, listed firms’ cash flow statements 
do not provide the separate item for cash payment of income tax, but only report an aggregate number of cash payment for all 
taxes (including income taxes). Thus, we use GAAP ETR as our main measure for tax avoidance. In the robustness checks, 
we find similar results when we use an estimate of CASH ETR or other alternative measures of tax avoidance. 
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knowledge they gain from the low-tax firms to assist their clients in achieving greater levels of 
tax avoidance.  
Auditors can help diffuse tax avoidance knowledge among clients in two stages: learning 
tax avoidance information from low-tax firms and then diffusing or transferring the information 
to focal firms. Hence, we explore whether the effect of partner network ties on tax avoidance 
at the focal firms varies with connected partners’ learning process measured by partners’ tenure 
with low-tax firms, and transferring process measured by the school ties between the connected 
partners and focal firms’ top executives.5 Longer tenure with low-tax firms allows the partners 
to better understand the tax avoidance strategies of clients. Social connection between 
connected partners and top executives may increase trust and the willingness to exchange 
information, which can affect the extent of knowledge diffusion among client portfolios and 
reduces apprehension about the veracity of the information being shared (Argote et al. 2003). 
Consistent with our expectation, we find that the effects of partner network ties on tax 
avoidance at focal firms are more pronounced when connected partners have longer tenure in 
low-tax firms and when connected partners have school ties with top executives at the focal 
firms.  
We perform several tests to provide more insights to our main results. First, we conduct 
a change analysis to rule out the alternative explanation that partner-specific expertise rather 
than information diffusion from low-tax firms to focal firms drive our results. Specifically, we 
examine whether tax avoidance of focal firms changes in the year their existing audit partners 
started auditing a low-tax firm. Our results show that focal firms in the change sample have 
                                                             
5 This is consistent with prior studies (e.g., Cohen et al. 2008, 2010; Guan et al. 2016) who define the existence of social ties 
between audit partners and executives if they attended the same school. 
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significantly lower ETRs compared to the previous year, suggesting that audit partners bring 
new tax avoidance information from their low-tax firms to other clients. Second, we show that 
audit fees of focal firms with auditor network ties to low-tax firms are significantly higher if 
their executives are not connected to the partners, suggesting that audit partners could benefit 
from sharing the tax avoidance knowledge with non-socially connected clients. Third, we find 
that the effect of auditor partner network ties to low-tax firms on tax avoidance is attenuated in 
the subset of clients audited by Top 10 audit firms, consistent with the notion that Top 10 audit 
firms have more incentive to protect their reputation and less incentive to share tax avoidance 
information with clients. However, we still find greater tax avoidance for clients of Top 10 
audit firms when connected partners have school ties with top executives at the focal firms.  
We also conduct tests to address the concerns of endogeneity and measurement errors.  
We find that connections to high-tax firms by common audit partners do not affect focal firms’ 
tax avoidance. This result alleviates the concerns that our results are mainly driven by selection 
bias. In addition, we find that the effect of partner networks to low-tax firms on tax avoidance 
exists independently of networks ties from common industry, geography, and board interlocks. 
Finally, our results are robust to four alternative measures of tax avoidance. 
Our study is related to a concurrent study by Bianchi et al. (2016). Using partner data from 
Italy, Bianchi et al. (2016) find that audit partners develop knowledge and contacts through 
collaboration with audit partners of other audit firms. Such collaboration can be conduits of 
knowledge spillover which reduces the amount of taxes paid by their clients. Our study differs 
from Bianchi et al. (2016) in that we examine the accumulation and transfer of knowledge 
across different clients that engage the same partner for the audit works and our research design 
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allows us to identify the channels of information source about tax avoidance. 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we extend prior work 
examining how knowledge of tax avoidance strategies disseminates across corporate social 
networks (Brown 2011; Brown and Drake 2014). We investigate the variation of corporate tax 
avoidance from the perspective of shared individual auditor network ties and provide novel 
evidence on the effect of such network ties on tax avoidance.  
Second, this study contributes to general research on social ties. Current literature on 
social ties mostly focuses on the social ties arising from board interlocks and between board of 
directors and executives (e.g. Chiu et al. 2013; Hwang and Kim 2009, Krishnan et al. 2011). 
Brown and Drake (2014) proposed that one challenge for future research is “to investigate how 
interpersonal ties map into inter-organizational network phenomena” (p503). By examining the 
association between individual audit partner network ties and tax avoidance, our paper provides 
a new dimension of inter-firm network ties through shared auditors.  
Third, we contribute to prior research relating to individual audit partners. Prior studies 
show that individual auditor characteristics influence audit outcomes (Gul et al. 2013; Lennox 
et al. 2014; Knechel et al. 2015; Aobdia et al. 2015; Li et al. 2017). We extend this line of 
enquiry by showing that individual audit partners also have an important bearing on tax 
avoidance of firms. Lastly, we provide new evidence that the effect of the network ties of audit 
partner is more pronounced when the partners and client executives have common school ties. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the institutional 
background in China, reviews the literature, and presents the research hypotheses. Section III 
describes the sample and research design. Section IV presents the main empirical results and 
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Section V report the results from the additional analyses. We conclude the paper in Section VI. 
II. BACKGROUND, PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Corporate taxation in China 
Before the economic reforms started in 1978, Chinese firms were mostly state-owned 
and hence non-independent entities. There was no corporate income tax in the central planning 
system. Starting from 1979, the Chinese government introduced a number of enterprise 
taxation reforms (Cai and Liu 2009). One of the most important reforms was enacted in 1994 
when the government introduced the “Corporate Income Tax Code” that overhauled corporate 
taxation. Under the code, all domestic firms pay 33% corporate income tax, except for some 
preferential tax treatment for certain types of firms. In 2008, the government modified the 
corporate statutory tax rates. Under the new tax code, Chinese listed firms are generally subject 
to the same statutory tax rate of 25%.  
The tax collection agencies were also reformed in 1994 as part of the introduction of 
“Corporate Income Tax Code.” After the reform, taxes are classified into central and local taxes, 
and a National Taxation bureau and provincial bureaus are responsible for collecting central 
taxes and local taxes separately. Both of them are under the supervision of the State 
Administration of Taxation. Corporate income tax is classified as a central tax and is collected 
by the National Taxation bureau and its branches in all provinces.  
While most studies on tax avoidance focus on the U.S. market, tax avoidance is also 
prevalent in China.6 Shevlin et al. (2012) find that Chinese listed firms shift income among 
                                                             
6 For example, the Chinese National Auditing Office uncovered 15.96 billion Chinese yuan or RMB as at October 
2015 based on random investigation of selected firms in 6 provinces (http://www.audit.gov.cn). Fisman and Wei 
(2004) also reported pervasive tariff evasion in China.  
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consolidated group members to reduce taxes. Tang et al. (2017) find that the conflicts between 
central and local governments arising from the 2002 tax sharing reform have led to more tax 
avoidance by local government-controlled firms. Lin et al. (2017) find that ties to politicians 
by corporate boards of directors weaken the effectiveness of tax authorities in constraining tax 
avoidance in China. An important reason for the widespread tax avoidance activities in China 
is the weak enforcement of tax code and the difficulties encountered in collecting corporate tax, 
such as insufficient manpower in the collection agency to deal with the increasing number of 
firms, lack of training and skills in the collection agency to collect corporate income tax (Cai 
and Liu 2009). In addition, pervasive anecdotal evidence and cases suggest a huge demand for 
tax planning knowledge and that firms do pay close attention to tax saving strategies in China.7  
Audit market in China  
The auditing market in China was established in the early 1980s. With the growth in the 
Chinese economy and stock market, the audit market in China has rapidly expanded. According 
to the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA), total audit fee revenues 
earned by the largest 100 audit firms in China are about RMB 58.4 billion in 2015, ranking the 
Chinese audit market among the major audit markets in the world. Another important feature 
of the Chinese audit market is that China’s auditing standards require engagement auditors to 
sign the audit reports and this information is publicly available. Typically two engagement 
auditors sign each audit report with the more senior signing auditor mainly performing the 
review work and the relatively junior signing auditor mainly administering the fieldwork (Gul 
et al. 2013). An audit partner generally conducts several audit engagements during the year. 
                                                             
7 There are numerous books and training courses on tax planning that suggest various means to minimize corporate 
tax legally in China. 
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Unlike the U.S. market where the Big N audit firms have oligopolistic dominance, the 
Chinese audit market is less concentrated (Chen et al. 2010). The less concentrated market 
structure induces fierce competition among audit firms, which in turn creates pressure for audit 
partners to acquire and retain clients. Meanwhile, the number of listed companies in China is 
small relative to that of the audit firms qualified to audit them, such a buyer’s market is likely 
to endow clients with more bargaining power and impose pressure on auditors fighting for their 
slice of the cake in the audit market (Chen et al. 2007; Chen et al. 2010). Beside the regular 
contractual auditing service, providing suggestions on tax avoidance is one important way for 
auditor to attract new clients or retain existing clients. In China, listed companies do not directly 
acquire tax consulting services from audit firms but they do rely on auditor’s advice on tax 
strategies.8 According to the news report, it is an “open secret” that auditors help their clients 
achieve better tax avoidance in China.9  
 Prior related literature  
Despite a large body of research on corporate tax avoidance, studies examining social 
connections between tax-avoiding firms is limited (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). Building on 
theory related to the diffusion of innovations and institutional isomorphism,10 Brown (2011) 
investigates the diffusion of aggressive corporate tax reporting among firms. She finds that 
network ties through board interlocks increase the likelihood of adopting a Corporate-Owned 
Life Insurance (COLI) tax shelter but the network ties via shared audit firm do not. Brown and 
                                                             
8 In our conversation with an audit partner, she shared with us an example of tax avoidance diffusion. She learned 
from one client that spending on IT system could be expensed for taxable income and shared this information 
immediately with other clients to help them lower their taxes. 
9 http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20050815/17581888261.shtml 
10 Diffusion theory concerns the spread of innovations, where an innovation is not limited to an objectively “new” 
practice, but relates to any practice that is “new” to the firm considering its adoption. 
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Drake (2014) examine the spread (contagion) of tax savings strategies among firms through 
board interlocks and find that firms with greater board ties to low-tax firms have lower cash 
ETRs. Moreover, they find that sharing the same audit firm amplifies the effect of board ties to 
low-tax firms. Their evidence suggests that low-tax firms are privy to tax-specific knowledge 
or experience about tax saving strategies, and this knowledge and experience is shared via firms’ 
social networks. Overall, prior studies suggest that the knowledge or experience about tax 
avoidance can be transferred via social ties among firms and shared intermediaries can serve 
as conduit for the flow of related knowledge or experience.  
Prior studies have also examined the economic consequences of social network formed 
through shared audit firm. For example, Johnstone et al. (2014) study auditor sharing by 
suppliers and customers within a supply chain. They find that auditor sharing at the city level 
is associated with higher audit quality and lower audit fees for supplier companies. Cai et al. 
(2016) report that the combined M&A announcement returns is significantly higher for 
acquiring and target firms sharing the same audit firm, and that sharing a common audit firm 
reduces M&A uncertainty. Dhaliwal et al. (2016) find that sharing the same audit firm primarily 
benefits the acquiring firm in the form of higher acquirer announcement returns, lower deal 
premiums, and higher deal completion rates.  
Auditors can influence corporate tax avoidance, even though they are not specifically 
contracted to provide tax consulting service to their clients.11 Maydew and Shackelford (2007) 
suggest that public accounting firms are well positioned to provide corporate tax planning 
                                                             
11 In China, information on whether audit firms also provide tax consulting service to their auditing clients is not 
publicly available. However, our prediction does not rely on the amount of tax services provided to clients. The 
main thrust of the paper is that individual auditors who form part of network ties to low-tax firms can act as 
underlying conduits for the flow of tax avoidance strategies across clients.   
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because they possess a deep understanding of both the tax and financial reporting consequences 
of different avoidance strategies. McGuire et al. (2012) report evidence that either industry tax 
or overall expertise (both audit and tax) of external audit firms providing both audit and tax 
services are associated with greater tax avoidance for their clients. Their evidence suggests that 
the audit firms with tax or overall expertise help their clients to devise tax avoidance strategies 
that benefit the client firms.  
In this study, we consider whether individual auditors act as tax planning intermediaries 
by facilitating both the implementation of tax strategies and the spread of tax planning 
strategies across client firms. Recently, researchers have been advocating for more research at 
the individual auditor level to better understand auditor behavior (e.g., DeFond and Zhang 2014; 
Lennox and Wu 2017). Auditing is inherently a judgmental decision-making process that is 
dependent on the abilities of partners who differ in their individual behaviors and attitudes 
(Ponemon and Gabhart 1990; Trompeter 1994; Ayers and Kaplan 2003). Consistent with this 
view, prior literature generally concludes that audit experience and industry expertise that 
determine audit quality resides at the individual auditor level rather than at the audit firm level 
(Gul et al. 2013; Zerni 2012; Goodwin and Wu 2014). Moreover, the auditing literature 
considers prior experience as the basis for auditor to acquire knowledge and develop expertise. 
Consistent with this “learning by doing” knowledge acquisition mode, Chen et al. (2014) find 
that individual auditors’ prior IPO auditing experience benefits the clients as reflected in higher 
audit quality during the IPO. 
Hypothesis development  
Social connections can influence corporate behavior because they facilitate the diffusion 
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of new ideas or new practices and enable the connected firms to learn from each other’s 
experiences (Haunschild 1993; Davis and Greve 1997; Brown and Drake 2014). Prior studies 
show that knowledge and experience about tax avoidance strategies can spread via social ties 
such as board interlocks, shared banks, and firms that are exposed to new tax avoidance 
practices through social connections could adopt the tax saving strategies after learning from 
the connected firms (Brown 2011; Brown and Drake 2014; Gallemore et al. 2017).12 
We posit that shared individual auditors could promote the diffusion of knowledge or 
experiences about tax saving strategies for several reasons. First, as suggested by McGuire et 
al. (2012), auditors could benefit from knowledge spillover from audit to tax when they audit 
the clients. Auditors could acquire valuable knowledge when they audit low-tax clients, which 
are typically large and complex firms, capital intensive firms, and firms that face financial 
constraints (Dyreng et al. 2008; Wilson 2009; Edwards et al. 2016). Specifically, in conducting 
their audit work, individual auditors have frequent confidential communications with their 
clients’ top management team and accumulate a considerable amount of private information 
about their clients, including client-specific tax saving strategies. Second, individual auditors 
are well suited to spread tax planning strategies across firms, because individual auditors 
contract with multiple companies. Prior research has shown that shared auditors facilitate the 
flow of information among the clients. For example, acting as useful information 
intermediaries, shared auditors can significantly reduce uncertainty throughout the M&A 
process (Cai et al. 2016; Dhaliwal et al. 2016). Aobdia (2015) documents that shared auditors 
                                                             
12 Gallemore et al. (2017) provide evidence that banks function as tax planning intermediaries. They find that bank 
clients experience significant tax reductions when they begin relationships with banks whose existing clients 
engage in greater tax planning. 
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transmit information among client portfolios that drives the similarities in their clients’ 
decisions.  
Finally, although auditors are limited on the services they can provide to audit clients for 
a fee, they have incentives to add value to their clients beyond the scope of the audit to retain 
existing clients and to build/keep a good relationship with them. One possible way for 
individual auditors to add value is to help clients to save taxes by using the tax-related 
experience or expertise they acquired from their other low-tax clients.  
Therefore, based on the acquisition of client-specific tax-related strategies and the 
transfer of such information within auditors’ client portfolios, it is reasonable to expect that 
shared individual auditors can act as conduits of tax avoidance diffusion among client firms. 
This incentive to provide tax avoidance strategies is likely amplified in the Chinese audit 
market because of the fierce competition (Chen et al. 2010). Hence, we state our first hypothesis 
in alternative form as follows: 
H1: Individual auditor network ties to low-tax firms are positively related to tax avoidance at 
the focal firm.  
Although we expect individual auditor network ties to low-tax firms to be positively 
related to tax avoidance at the focal firm, there are counter arguments against finding the 
hypothesized association. First, the audit partners are committed to provide audit services and 
opine on the quality of financial reporting, they are not obligated to provide consulting services 
on tax strategies. Second, tax strategies can be risky activities (Rego and Wilson 2012; Hasan 
et al. 2014) and audit partners can incur penalties and fines for helping clients with tax 
avoidance if challenged by the tax authority (Stice 1991; Krishnan and Krishnan 1997). 
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Aggressive tax avoidance has been shown to increase stock price crash risk (Kim et al. 2011) 
and news about a firm’s involvement in tax shelters reduces stock price (Hanlon and Slemrod 
2009). The potential loss in shareholders’ wealth can also precipitate lawsuits against the 
auditor, thus increasing auditor litigation risk.  
Third, being associated with tax avoidance could subject the audit partner to reputational 
costs. By helping clients to avoid taxes, audit partners could expose themselves to negative 
publicity and media attention.  Hence, audit partners with network ties may want to preserve 
their reputation and deter their clients from aggressive tax avoidance strategies or require their 
clients to record higher tax reserves that could offset some of the potential benefits associated 
with tax avoidance strategies. Consequently, whether audit partners encourage or discourage 
client firms to implement tax avoidance strategies is an empirical question. 
Learning process: the effect of partner tenure at low-tax firms  
In our primary analysis, we examine the role of individual audit partner network on tax 
avoidance information diffusion among partners’ client portfolios. The precondition is that 
connected partners can learn tax avoidance knowledge from low-tax firms. Therefore, we next 
explore whether the effect of partner network on tax avoidance at the focal firms varies with 
connected partners’ learning process.  
The connected audit partners could “learn” tax-related strategies when they provide audit 
services to low-tax firms. Some of these can be applied quickly to other clients (e.g. some tax 
deduction policies), while others may take more time for auditors to fully understand (e.g. 
comprehensive or complex tax planning strategies). As learning theory in psychology (Lapre 
et al. 2000; Ritter and Schooler 2001) suggests, it takes time for an individual to acquire specific 
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knowledge. Consistent with this view, auditors experience a significant learning curve with 
new clients (Knapp 1991), and much of the knowledge acquired during an audit is client-
specific (Kinney and McDaniel 1996). Over time, the partner becomes familiar with the client’s 
business, nature of operations, and the accounting information system and learns more 
regarding the critical issues that necessitate specific attention (e.g., Knapp 1991; DeAngelo 
1981; Carey and Simnett 2006; Beck and Wu 2006). Knechel et al. (2007) document that soft 
information (client-specific knowledge) is vital to auditors being able to plan effective audits, 
identify risk, and interpret evidence appropriately. Survey evidence also suggests that longer 
tenure allows the partners to build relationships with the client that can then aid in 
understanding the client’s business (Daugherty et al. 2012). Based on the above reasoning, we 
state our second hypothesis as follows: 
H2: The effect of individual auditor network ties to low-tax firms on tax avoidance at the focal 
firm is stronger when connected partners have longer tenure in the low-tax firms.  
 
Transfer process: The effect of school ties between audit partners and top executives at 
the focal firms   
As discussed earlier, audit partners are subject to potential risk of penalty or even 
lawsuits for sharing the information about tax strategies of low-tax firms with other clients. 
The existence of such risk could prevent auditors from sharing the tax saving strategies 
especially with clients that are not well-connected. Social ties are critical in China because 
Chinese culture has long been known for its emphasis on interpersonal relationships, also 
known as “Guanxi” in all economic and social transactions (Cheng and Rosett 1991; Bian 
1997). Hence, social connections between individual auditors and clients become very 
important in communication between them (Guan et al. 2016). We expect audit partners that 
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are connected with focal firms’ top executives are more likely to communicate tax avoidance 
information.  
Following Guan et al. (2016), we focus on school ties arising from sharing an 
educational link, which is one specific form of social ties affecting the decision making 
process.13 Individuals who attended the same schools are likely to have the same background 
and similar interests (McPherson et al. 2001). Connections forged through school ties enjoy 
enhanced interaction via in-jokes, shared traditions, and a sense of group belonging, as 
evidenced by alumni networks, newsletters, donations, and college sports events. Prior studies 
suggest that a common educational background fosters social ties and result in greater 
information sharing. Prior studies document that school ties can enhance value in mutual fund 
investments (Cohen et al. 2008), analyst recommendations (Cohen et al. 2010), venture capital 
investments (Hochberg et al. 2007), corporate investments, and financing decisions (e.g., 
Engelberg et al. 2012; Schmidt 2015), presumably by facilitating more efficient information 
transfer.14 
We expect school ties between connected partners and top executives of the focal firms 
to affect auditor network ties on tax avoidance at the focal firms. Socially connected people 
tend to follow communal norms that promote mutual caring and trust (Silver 1990; Guan et al. 
2016). Connected actors suffer disutility, either self-imposed (such as guilt) or imposed by 
                                                             
13 Other than common education experience, some prior studies also use employment history or club membership 
to measure social connection (e.g., Ke et al. 2018; Duchin and Sosyura 2013). In China, club membership is not 
a common social activity and employment history information is not publically available.  
14 For example, Cohen et al. (2008) show that fund managers invest more in socially connected firms with board 
members sharing education networks and the returns from these investments are higher. Cohen et al. (2010) find 
that sell-side analysts perform better if they share an alma mater with key executives of covered firms. Engelberg 
et al. (2012) provide evidence that cost of borrowing is lower when the employees of the borrower and banks have 
attended the same college. They further find that the credit ratings and stock performance of the lender improved 
afterwards. 
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others (such as disapproval or a bad reputation) when the communal norms are violated (Elster 
1989). To the extent that the ties between connected partners and top executives can be seen as 
a communal norm that fosters mutual trust, we expect connected partners to be more willing to 
transfer tax avoidance information to top executives with school ties to avoid “not being nice” 
and to foster good friendship with such schoolmates. Moreover, interactions and greater 
comfort between individuals allow connected agents to better communicate subtle and sensitive 
information that would otherwise not be shared (Granovetter 2005). Some tax avoidance 
information could be sensitive and difficult to transmit. The school connection between 
executives at focal firms and audit partners increases the trust and willingness to exchange 
sensitive information, lowers information gathering costs, facilitates information transfer 
between economic agents, and results in better decision making (Kalmijn and Flap 2001; Ishii 
and Xuan 2014). Based on the above reasoning, we state our second hypothesis as follows: 
H3: The effect of individual auditor network ties to low-tax firms on tax avoidance at the focal 
firm is stronger when connected partners have school ties with clients’ top executives. 
III. SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
Sample construction 
We begin with all Chinese companies listed in the A-share market between 1999 and 
2015 and obtain financial statement and stock market data from the China Stock Market and 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. We begin with the year 1999 because the 
educational background of executives was available starting from that year. Data for individual 
audit partner data are also obtained from the CSMAR database. The sample selection 
procedures are outlined in Table 1. Consistent with prior research (e.g. Chen et al. 2010; Brown 
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and Drake 2014; Li et al. 2017), we exclude firms in the financial industries, and firm-year 
observations with negative pre-tax income as these firms likely have different objectives and 
opportunities for tax avoidance (Brown and Drake 2014). We also exclude observations where 
GAAP effective tax rates are larger than one or less than zero. To construct our measure of 
individual audit partner network ties to low-tax firms, we collected detailed partner-level 
information. We delete observations with missing individual audit partner data, and audit 
partners without any ties with other client firms. Finally, we remove observations with missing 
values for the control variables used in the empirical analysis. Our final sample consists of 
18,610 firm-year observations. Panel B of Table 1 shows that the proportion of low-tax firms 
with shared auditor and without shared auditor has increased steadily over the years.  
Measuring tax avoidance  
Following prior studies, we use GAAP effective tax rate (ETR) as our measure of tax 
avoidance. ETR is defined as the total tax expense divided by pre-tax income excluding special 
items. We do not suggest that firms are saving taxes because of illegal or improper means. We 
use GAAP ETR in the current year to identity low-tax firms and measure firms’ tax avoidance 
instead of a three-year average measure used in Brown and Drake (2014) for the following 
reasons. First, unlike board directors, audit partners do not have a long-term auditing service 
contract with client firms who are more concerned about the current year’s business and 
financial reporting consequences.15 Second, as noted by Tang et l. (2017, p248), “the common 
mechanisms through which firms avoid taxes in China include shifting income to subsidiaries 
with a low tax rate by manipulating transfer prices, using different sales cutoff points for book 
                                                             
15 According to Gul et al. (2018), the incidence of partner change is about 40% in China. In other words, the 
turnover of partners is more frequent than that of board directors.  
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and tax purposes, capitalizing repairs and betterment expenditures for book, but expensing 
them for tax, and overstating the costs and expenses of related party transactions.” Some of 
these strategies could be done immediately and hence affect the ETR in the current year.16 Third, 
the low-tax firms identified in our setting are relatively stable during our sample period; about 
55% of low-tax firms are identified as low-tax firms in the following year. In our sensitivity 
tests, we also use several alternative measures of tax avoidance, including an estimated cash 
effective tax rate (CASH_ETR) and modified measures of ETR. Our results continue to hold 
for these alternative measures of tax avoidance.  
Measuring social network with low-tax firms 
Our main variable of interest is the formation of a social network through sharing the 
same audit partners with low-tax firms. Following prior studies (Chiu et al. 2013; Brown and 
Drake 2014), we construct two proxies, PTIES and LPTIES. PTIES is defined as the number 
of low-tax firms to which the focal firm is connected via a shared individual audit partner, 
scaled by the total number of firms to which the focal firm is connected via shared individual 
audit partner; while LPTIES is defined as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of low-
tax firms to which the focal firm is connected via shared partners. In each year, we identify 
low-tax firms as those firms ranked in the lowest quintile based on the effective tax rate adjusted 
for the industry median (ADJ_ETR).17   
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for our sample partitioned by quintiles based on 
                                                             
16 We are also aware that some tax avoidance mechanisms take more than a year to implement, such as establishing 
subsidiaries in tax havens. In the robustness checks, we use average ETR of rolling three years to proxy for tax 
avoidance, and our main results still hold.  
17 Consistent with Brown and Drake (2014), we construct our measure of low-tax ties to capture how successful 
a firm is in avoiding taxes relative to its industry peers. Our primary results are robust to using the ranked effective 
tax rate without industry adjustment. The industry classification is based on the definitions outlined in the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). 
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the industry-adjusted ETR. Firms in the lowest quintile (Rank ETR=1) have an average ETR 
of 7.80 percent, while firms in the highest quintile (Rank ETR=5) have an average ETR of 
39.74 percent. We observe a similar pattern for the industry-adjusted ETR (ADJ_ETR).  
We report TIES, the total number of firms to which the focal firm is connected via shared 
partners in column (3), and our main variables of interest, PTIES and LPTIES in the last two 
columns. On average, the total number of firms to which the focal firm is connected via shared 
partner is about 4.5 across all quintiles of ETR. Within the lowest quintile of effect tax rate 
(Rank ETR=1), 15.31% of a firm’s total ties to other firms via shared partners are connected to 
low-tax firms. In contrast, within the highest quintile of effect tax rate (Rank ETR=5), the 
average percentage of ties to low-tax firms through shared partners is 13.83%. The univariate 
test for the PTIES between the lowest and highest quintile is statistically significant (p<0.01). 
We find very similar pattern for LPTIES. Overall, the descriptive statistics in Table 2 are 
consistent with our prediction in H1 that individual auditor network ties to low-tax firms is 
positively associated with tax avoidance at the focal firm. 
Research design 
We estimate the following OLS regression to test H1:  
ETR= β0 + β1 PTIES (LPTIES) + β2 OTIES (LOTIES) + β3 SIZE + β4 ROA+ β5 LEV 
   + β6 PPE + β7 INTAN+ β8 MB+ β9 GROWTH+ β10 AGE+ β11 INVENT+ β12 ROI 
 + β13 TACC+ β14 CASH+Year/Industry/Region fixed-effects + ε                     (1) 
The dependent variable is ETR, the firm’s effective tax rate.18  The two main test 
variables are PTIES and LPTIES. We predict β1 to be negative, suggesting that network ties to 
low-tax firms is positively related to tax avoidance at the focal firm. We also include the number 
                                                             
18 Consistent with Brown and Drake (2014), we use the original effective tax rate ETR as the dependent variable. 
Our inferences remain unchanged if we use the industry-adjusted ETR as the dependent variable. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3229564 
 
22 
 
of low-tax firms that the focal firm is connected via shared audit office (OTIES and LOTIES) 
to examine the possibility of tax-related information diffusion through the audit office. Prior 
studies provide mixed evidence as to whether audit firm/office acts as conduits of information 
transfer of tax avoidance (Brown 2011; Brown and Drake 2014).   
We include various firm characteristics to control for other factors that may affect firms’ 
tax avoidance (Brown and Drake 2014; Chen et al. 2010; McGuire et al. 2012; Li et al. 2017; 
Tang et al. 2017). We control for firm size (SIZE) because larger firms may have access to more 
tax-planning strategies, resulting in lower taxes. On the other hand, larger firms may also be 
subjected to heavier political pressure and greater scrutiny from the government, resulting in 
less tax avoidance. We control for firm performance (ROA) since firms with low profitability 
have less incentives to avoid taxes.  We control for firm’s leverage (LEV), capital intensity 
(PPE), intangible assets (INTAN) and inventory intensity (INVENT) because prior research 
suggests that firm’s complexities in operations are associated with tax avoidance (e.g. Rego 
2003; Chen et al. 2010; McGuire et al. 2012; Brown and Drake 2014). Chen et al. (2010) 
suggest that growing firms may undertake more investments in tax-favored assets that generate 
timing differences in the recognition of tax expenses. Therefore, we control for firm growth 
measured by growth rate in sales (GROWTH) and market-to-book ratio (MB). We control for 
the level of firm’s cash holdings (CASH) since financially constrained firms are likely to avoid 
more taxes (Edwards et al. 2016). In China, income from certain investments, such as interest 
income from government bonds, is tax-exempt. Hence we include ROI, which is defined as 
investment income scaled by total assets, to control for the firm’s return on investment. Lastly, 
we control for the level of total accruals (TACC) since Frank et al. (2009) find that financial 
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reporting quality is related to tax avoidance. All control variables are measured 
contemporaneously as the dependent variables, since we expect these factors to associate with 
tax avoidance contemporaneously (Chen et al. 2010). The detailed definitions of these variables 
are presented in the Appendix. In all regressions, we include indicator variables to control for 
year, industry and region-fixed effects.19  
IV. MAIN ANALYSIS 
Descriptive statistics  
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics of key variables used in our analysis. To 
mitigate the undue influence of extreme observations and potential coding errors, we winsorize 
all the continuous variables at 1% and 99% percent. The mean and median tax avoidance 
measure, effective tax rate (ETR) are 20.8% and 17.5%, respectively, consistent with prior 
studies (e.g. Li et al. 2017). On average, 14.4% of partner network ties to other firms are 
connected to low-tax firms, while 13.4% of network ties are connected through shared audit 
offices. The descriptive statistics for the other independent variables are also presented in Table 
3.  
Effect of partner network ties to low-tax firms on firm’s tax avoidance  
Table 4 presents the results of estimating Equation (1). In columns (1) and (2), we only 
include firms’ shared audit office network ties to low-tax firms (OTIES and LOTIES, 
respectively). The coefficients for these two variables are negative but insignificant, suggesting 
that shared audit office with low-tax firms itself does not act as a conduit for diffusion of tax 
                                                             
19 The region refers to the province where the listed companies are located. Following Tang et al. (2017), we 
control for region-fixed effects since preferential tax policies vary substantially across regions in China.  
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avoidance practices. This finding is in line with Brown (2011) who finds no evidence of tax 
information diffusion through shared audit firm. We conjecture that partner network ties to low-
tax firms are more likely to facilitate the flow of tax avoidance strategies. In columns (3) and 
(4), we add PTIES and LPTIES as our main test variables, respectively. Consistent with H1, the 
coefficients on both test variables are negative and significant at the 1% level. The results 
indicate that, all else equal, partner network ties to low-tax firms are associated with greater 
tax avoidance at the focal firms, as reflected in lower ETRs. Compared with a baseline 
unconditional mean value of ETR of 20.8 percent (see Table 3), a one standard deviation change 
in PTIES is associated with a 5.78 (=1.2/20.8) percent reduction in ETR.    
With regard to the control variables, the coefficients on SIZE, ROA, MB are negative 
and statistically significant, indicating that firms that are larger, more profitable, and firms that 
have higher growth opportunities have lower ETRs. Further, more leveraged, older firms, and 
firms that have more inventories report higher ETRs. These results are generally consistent 
with prior studies.  
Learning process: effect of partner tenure at low-tax firms  
In H2, we predict that the effect of partner network ties to low-tax firms on tax 
avoidance is more pronounced when connected partners have a longer tenure in low-tax firms 
due to acquisition of knowledge through learning. To test H2, we partition partners network 
ties to low-tax firms into two types: PTIES long tenure (LPTIES long tenure) and PTIES short tenure 
(LPTIES short tenure). Tenure is considered as long when the connected partners’ tenure in the low-
tax firms is greater than the median value of tenure. We expect the connected partners to learn 
tax avoidance knowledge more efficiently in low-tax firms with longer tenure. H2 predicts that 
the coefficient on PTIES long tenure (LPTIES long tenure) is more negative than the coefficient on 
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PTIES short tenure (LPTIES short tenure).  
We report the results in Table 5. In Column (1), we find that both coefficients on PTIES 
long tenure and PTIES short tenure are negative and statistically significant.  More importantly, the 
coefficient on PTIES long tenure is significantly more negative than PTIES short tenure (p=0.0630). In 
Column (2), we obtain similar results for the log-transformed measure of network ties. Overall, 
the results in Table 5 are consistent with H2. 
Transfer process: effect of school ties between connected partners and top executives at 
the focal firms  
In H3, we predict that the effect of partner network ties to low-tax firms on tax 
avoidance is more pronounced when connected partners have school ties with top executives 
at the focal firms. To test H3, we partition partners network ties to low-tax firms into two types: 
PTIES with school ties (LPTIES with school ties) where the connected partners have school ties with top 
executives at the focal firms and PTIES without school ties (LPTIES without school ties) where the 
connected partners have no school tie with top executives at the focal firms. Similar to Guan 
et al. (2016), top executives include the board chair, the CEO and the CFO, who are likely to 
significantly influence tax planning and who are likely to have frequent communications with 
engagement partners during the auditing process. We define the existence of school tie if any 
of the client company’s top executives has a common alma mater with the connected partners.20 
H3 posits that the school ties between connected partners and top executives enhance the trust 
and hence the more likely the transfer of tax-related knowledge to the focal firms. A finding 
that the coefficient on PTIES with school ties (LPTIES with school ties) is more negative than the 
                                                             
20 This definition is consistent with Guan et al. (2016). The school tie here indicates whether any of related parties 
attended the same universities for either undergraduate or graduate degrees, regardless of having attended the 
school in the same periods, on the same campuses, or for the same majors.  
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coefficient on PTIES without school ties (LPTIES without school ties) would provide evidence consistent 
with H3.  
Table 6 reports the results for testing H3. Both coefficients on PTIES with school ties 
(LPTIES with school ties) and PTIES without school ties (LPTIES without school ties) are negative and 
significant at conventional levels. The F-test reported in the table shows that the coefficient on 
PTIES with school ties (LPTIES with school ties) is significantly more negative than the coefficient on 
PTIES without school ties (LPTIES without school ties) (p=0.0544 and p=0.0355, respectively). The results 
are consistent with H3, which indicates that partner network ties to low-tax firms has a stronger 
effect on tax avoidance at the focal firms when the connected partners have school ties with 
top executives at the focal firm.  
V. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
 We conduct a series of additional analysis to provide greater insight to our main results. 
Because the results for our two main variables PTIES and LPTIES are similar, in the interest of 
parsimony, we only report results based on PTIES in the following tables.  
Change analysis  
Although we use a battery of control variables in our regressions, we may still omit 
some important firm or partner characteristics that are associated with low-tax firms that results 
in higher tax avoidance. For example, it is possible that some partners have tax expertise which 
is not “spillover” from auditing services or they have some kind of connections to tax regulators, 
so they can help their clients to avoid more taxes independently of their network ties with low-
tax firms. We use a change specification to mitigate such concern. Specifically, to control for 
unobserved partner characteristics, we use a reduced sample where the firms do not change any 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3229564 
 
27 
 
partner during the year t. We identify the set of firms that begin with no partner ties to low-tax 
firms in year t-1 but become partner-connected to low-tax firms due to partners’ client 
portfolios change. This set of firms represents our treatment firms. Our control firms are firms 
that are not partner-connected to low-tax firms in both year t-1 and t.21 We then estimate the 
following model:  
 △ETR= β0 +β1 △PTIES + β2 △OTIES + β3 △SIZE+ β4 △ROA  
+ β5 △LEV + β6 △PPE + β7 △INTAN+ β8 △MB+ β9 △GROWTH 
+ β10 AGE+ β11 △INVENT+ β12 △ROI+ β13 △TACC+ β14 △CASH  
+ Year/Industry/Region fixed-effects + ε                          (2) 
              
The dependent variable (△ETR) is the change of a firm’s effective tax rate from year t-
1 to year t, where year t is the year when treatment firms become partner-connected to low-tax 
firms due to a change in partners’ client portfolios. Likewise, all other variables are calculated 
as changes from year t-1 to year t.  
We report the results from estimating the change model in Table 7. The coefficient on 
△PTIES in column (1) is negative and significant at the 5% level, indicating that establishing 
a new partner tie to a low-tax firm helps the focal firms to avoid more taxes. Because our 
sample consists of firms that do not change partners during the year, the change from no partner 
ties to partner ties is due entirely to tax avoidance knowledge learned in the new low-tax 
firms.22,23 In column (2), we find that the coefficient on △PTIES with school ties is negative and 
                                                             
21 Our sample consists of 3,381 observations where neither of the treatment nor control firms change partners 
from year t-1 to year t. Of these, 1,090 observations represent treatment firms and 2,291 observations represent 
control firms.  
22 We also examine the tax avoidance change for firms whose partners are connected to low-tax firms in year t-1 
but not connected to low-tax firms in year t. We find no significant change in tax avoidance due to loss of partner 
ties to low-tax firms.   
23 In Table 5, we find that partners with short tenure also help clients to lower their ETR but the decline in ETR is 
significantly smaller compared to partners with long tenure. Combining this with the results reported in Table 7, 
the evidence suggests that partners learn about tax information starting from the first year of engagement (i.e. 
when tenure is short). The decline in ETR in the first year of engagement is not due to the knowledge specificity 
of the partner, but rather due to the learning effect, and this learning effect is amplified when tenure increases.  
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significant at the 5% level while the coefficient on △PTIES without school ties is insignificant, 
suggesting that the school ties between connected partners and top executives at the focal firms 
enhance the effect of partner ties on tax avoidance.  
 Audit fees analysis  
We next analyze whether the individual audit partners’ ties to low-tax firms influence 
audit fees. As discussed earlier, the connected partners may share the tax saving information 
obtained from other low-tax firms to their clients to keep good relationship with the client or 
to charge higher audit fees. We use the following model to test whether audit fees are 
systematically higher in the presence of partner ties to low-tax firms.     
Ln(Fee)= β0 + β1 PTIES + β2 OTIES + β3 SIZE + β4 ROA  
+ β5 LEV + β6 PPE + β7 INTAN+ β8 MB+ β9 GROWTH+ β10 AGE 
+ β11 INVENT+ β12 ROI+ β13 TACC+ β14 CASH 
+Year/Industry/Region fixed-effects + ε       (3) 
where Ln(Fee) is the natural logarithm of annual audit fees. We report the results in Table 8. In 
column (1), the coefficients on PTIES is insignificant, suggesting that the connected partners 
do not charge higher audit fees for the transfer of tax-sharing strategies. However, in column 
(2), the coefficient on PTIES without school ties is positive and significant at the 5% level, indicating 
that the connected partners charge higher audit fees by providing tax saving strategies obtained 
from other low-tax firms if they have no school ties with the top executives at the focal firm. 
The results suggest an economic reason why connected partners are willing to share tax saving 
strategies from low-tax firms to focal firms, especially when there are no social ties between 
them.  
Audit firm type and the effect of partner network ties  
We examine the effect of shared partner ties with low-tax firms on firm’s tax avoidance 
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for Top 10 versus Non-Top 10 audit firms. This analysis provides some insight into whether 
the Chinese evidence provided in this paper can be generalized to other markets that are 
dominated by large audit firms. Large audit firms may implement better quality control 
procedures and provide high quality audits (Fang et al. 2017). Consequently, 
reputation/litigation costs may be larger for auditors in large audit firms. Therefore, we expect 
the effect of partner network ties to low-tax firms on tax avoidance to be attenuated in large 
audit firms.  
Following prior literature (Fang et al. 2017; He et al. 2017), we classify Top 10 audit 
firms and Non-Top 10 audit firms according to their market share of audited clients in China. 
We estimate the regression separately for Top 10 and Non-Top 10 audit firm sub-samples. The 
regression results are reported in Table 9. In columns (1) and (2), we find that the coefficients 
on PTIES are negative and significant only in Non-Top 10 audit firm sub-samples, suggesting 
that the effect of partner ties to low-tax firms on tax avoidance is attenuated in Top 10 audit 
firms. In contrast, we find that the coefficient on PTIES with school ties in columns (3) and (4) is 
negative and significant for both Top 10 and Non-Top 10 audit firms. Overall, the results 
indicate that the connected partners also share the tax saving information from other low-tax 
firms with clients in Top 10 audit firms when they have school ties with top executives at the 
focal firms.  
Endogeneity concerns  
In our main analysis, we treat individual audit partner network ties as exogenous, but 
like other studies on social network, our study is also subject to endogeneity concerns (Brown 
and Drake 2014). Endogenous partner-client matching may suggest that firms seek to select 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3229564 
 
30 
 
audit partners who likely have experience at tax avoidance and vice versa. As argued by Brown 
and Drake (2014), if the endogenous selection is driving our results and tax avoidance is merely 
a consequence of selection process, then the partner network effect should be symmetrical and 
firms with partners’ high-tax ties should exhibit less tax avoidance (i.e., have higher ETRs). 
We replace the identity of “low-tax” with “high-tax” using the same approach and re-estimate 
the results. As shown in Table 10, the coefficients on HPTIES, HPTIES long tenure, HPTIES short 
tenure, HPTIES with school ties, and HPTIES without school ties are all insignificant. The asymmetric 
results suggest that tax avoidance (i.e., lower ETRs) at the focal firms is associated with their 
low-tax ties via shared audit partners but not its high-tax ties, consistent with firms acquiring 
knowledge and information related to tax saving strategies from shared audit partner networks 
with low-tax firms.  
Alternative networks: common industry, geography or board interlocks 
Previous literature documents the spread (contagion) or information transfer occurs 
between firms in common industries, between spatially proximate firms or between firms with 
board interlocks (Chiu et al. 2013; Brown 2011; Brown and Drake 2014; Cai et al. 2014). We 
conduct additional tests to explore the interaction effect of partner network ties to low-tax firms 
and other types of network with low-tax firms on focal firm’s tax avoidance.  
Firms in the same industry or same geographical network often use similar tax saving 
strategies. We construct PTIES same ind (PTIES same reg) as the number of low-tax firms the focal 
firm is connected via shared partners within the same industry/province and PTIES dif ind  
(PTIES dif reg) as the number of low-tax firms the focal firm is connected via shared partners 
outside of its industry/province.  
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We present the results for the networks through industry and geographical location in 
columns (1) and (2) of Table 11. In column (1), PTIES same ind and PTIES dif ind are both negative 
and significant. The F-test shows that the two coefficients are not significantly different. We 
also find very similar results in column (2) for the connectedness through same regions versus 
different regions. Overall, the results indicate that the role of audit partner networks to low-tax 
firms on tax avoidance exists independently from common industry or common geography.  
We next explore the interactive effects between partner network ties and board 
interlocks. Brown and Drake (2014) document that information on a range of tax avoidance 
strategies is shared among firms through their board interlocks. In column (3), we explore 
whether the effect of partner ties is enhanced when board interlocks exist. We separate PTIES 
into two groups based on whether the focal firm and low-tax firms have any board interlock. 
Specifically, PTIES interlocks is defined as the number of low-tax firms the focal firm is connected 
via shared partners and shared board interlocks, and PTIES no interlocks is defined as the number 
of low-tax firms the focal firm is connected via shared partners but no shared board interlocks. 
The results in column (3) of Table 11 indicate no significant difference in ETR between the 
focal firm and low-tax firms that have board interlock versus those without board interlock. 
This evidence suggests that shared partners with low-tax firms influence focal firm’s tax 
avoidance independently of board interlocks.   
Controlling for firm fixed-effect 
Although we use a battery of control variables in our regressions, we may still omit 
some important firm characteristics that are associated with low-tax firms that results in higher 
tax avoidance.  To mitigate such a concern, we re-estimate the regressions by including firm 
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fixed-effect in the models. Our untabulated results indicate that our main results remain after 
controlling for firm fixed-effects. 
Review partner versus engagement partner 
In China, each firm has two partners to sign off the audit report, and in most cases, the 
two partners share the same legal liability (Lennox et al. 2014). We explore whether there exists 
any difference for partner network ties formed by review partner versus engagement partner. 
Our untabulated results indicate that the review partner and engagement partner play similar 
roles in transferring tax saving information among client portfolios.  
Alternative measures for tax avoidance  
 We use four alternative measures for tax avoidance to test the robustness of our results. 
First, Chinese listed firm are subject to varying applicable tax rates (ATRs) that arise from 
numerous tax preferential policies. Following Amiram et al. (2012) and Tang et al. (2017), we 
use a modified ETR measured as ETR minus the firm’s ATR (ModETR) to mitigate the concern 
that the ETRs are merely picking up ATRs. Second, following Brown and Drake (2014) and 
Gallemore et al. (2017), we use a three-year average measure of ETR to proxy for tax avoidance. 
Specifically, we define ETR3 as the sum of total tax expense each year over the three-year 
period, divided by the sum of pre-tax income over the same period. Our third measure of tax 
avoidance is the cash ETR (Dyreng et al. 2008; Brown and Drake 2014). Following Li et al. 
(2017), we use an indirect method to calculate cash ETRs defined as the current portion of total 
tax expense plus start-of-the-year tax payable minus end-of-the-year tax payable, divided by 
pre-tax income. Our fourth measure of tax avoidance is ETR computed based on operating cash 
flow since accrual-based earnings management may affect pre-tax accounting income and 
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consequently, the ETR (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). Following Tang et al. (2017), we use cash 
flow from operations instead of pre-tax income in the denominator to calculate ETRs denoted 
as ETRcashflow. 
We then identify low-tax firms and calculate the partner network ties to low-tax firms 
based on the above four alternative measures of tax avoidance. We report the results in Table 
12. Overall, our main inferences remain unchanged for these alternate measures of tax 
avoidance.  
VI. CONCLUSION  
In this study, we investigate whether network ties formed by audit partners affect tax 
avoidance. We hypothesize that network ties of individual auditors to low-tax clients facilitate 
the learning and sharing of tax specific knowledge that can help client firms to save taxes. 
Consistent with our expectation, we find that tax avoidance is positively associated with a 
firm’s audit partner network ties to low-tax firms. Further, we find that connected partners are 
more likely to learn from other low-tax firms when they have longer tenure, and more likely to 
share the tax saving information from other low-tax firms when they have additional school 
ties with top executives at the focal firm. We also find evidence that connected partners charge 
higher audit fees for sharing tax information if they have no school ties with top executives at 
the focal firms. Although we do not find evidence that connected partners help clients to reduce 
taxes for clients of Top 10 audit firm, we do find that these partners help clients of Top 10 audit 
firms to avoid taxes when they have common school ties with top executives at the focal firms. 
The effect of network ties of auditors to low-tax clients persists after controlling for the 
presence of other alternative networks such as common industry, geography and board 
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interlocks. Our results are also robust after controlling for the endogeneity concerns of client-
auditor matching, firm fixed effects, and other alternative measures of tax avoidance.  
 Our study directly responds to the call in Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) for more research 
on the social connections between low-tax firms and makes an incremental contribution to the 
literature on tax avoidance. We extend this line of enquiry by showing that network ties of audit 
partners to low-tax clients facilitate the learning and sharing of tax specific knowledge that 
results in more tax avoidance.  
A caveat in our study is the generalizability of the finding to other economies given 
that social connection is relatively more important in the relationship-based Chinese economy. 
Future research may explore the effect of auditor network ties on tax avoidance on more 
market-based economics such as the U.S. when data on partner information is available. 
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 Table 1 sample selection and distribution 
 
Panel A: sample selection  
 N 
Observations available over period 1999-2015 with non-missing total assets 29633 
Less:   
Observations in the financial or insurance industry 348 
Observations with negative pretax income 3647 
Observations with unusual effective tax rates ETR (larger than 1 or less than 0) 1236 
Observations with missing auditor information  2042 
Observations without auditor ties with other firms  2128 
Observations with missing data necessary to calculate firm-level variables  1622 
Final sample 18610 
 
Panel B: sample distribution by year  
Year No of firms with partner 
connection to low-tax 
firms (1) 
No of firms without 
partner connection to 
low-tax firms (2) 
No. of firms in 
each year (3) 
=(1+2) 
Percentage over  
total by year 
(4) = (3)/Total 
1999 238 257 495 2.66% 
2000 311 297 608 3.27% 
2001 385 280 665 3.57% 
2002 387 363 750 4.03% 
2003 424 397 821 4.41% 
2004 396 422 818 4.40% 
2005 336 434 770 4.14% 
2006 366 477 843 4.53% 
2007 425 552 977 5.25% 
2008 370 576 946 5.08% 
2009 451 600 1051 5.65% 
2010 573 751 1324 7.11% 
2011 695 832 1527 8.21% 
2012 811 934 1745 9.38% 
2013 830 969 1799 9.67% 
2014 770 986 1756 9.44% 
2015 633 1082 1715 9.22% 
Total 8401 10209 18610 100% 
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Table 2 Comparisons among Quintiles of ETRs 
 
 N ETR ADJ_ETR TIES PTIES LPTIES 
 
Rank ETR=1 
 
3728 
0.0780 
(0.0770) 
-0.1102 
(-0.1027) 
4.5692 
(4.0000) 
0.1531 
(0.0000) 
0.4035 
(0.0000) 
 
Rank ETR=2 
 
3722 
0.1404 
(0.1358) 
-0.0367 
(-0.0335) 
4.7319 
(4.0000) 
0.1467 
(0.0000) 
0.4115 
(0.0000) 
 
Rank ETR=3 
 
3721 
0.1846 
(0.1685) 
0.0006 
(0.0000) 
4.5195 
(4.0000) 
0.1415 
(0.0000) 
0.3868 
(0.0000) 
 
Rank ETR=4 
 
3722 
0.2394 
(0.2321) 
0.0545 
(0.0497) 
4.4970 
(4.0000) 
0.1411 
(0.0000) 
0.3823 
(0.0000) 
 
Rank ETR=5 
 
3717 
0.3974 
(0.3519) 
0.2199 
(0.1683) 
4.3594 
(4.0000) 
0.1383 
(0.0000) 
0.3612 
(0.0000) 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the mean and median (in parenthesis) comparing network ties to low-tax firms via shared partners for quintiles of ETRs.  
See Appendix for complete variable definitions.   
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables 
 
VARIABLES N Mean Std. Dev P25 Median P75 
ETR 18,610 0.2080 0.1350 0.1300 0.1750 0.2610 
PTIES 18,610 0.1440 0.2130 0.0000 0.0000 0.2500 
LPTIES 18,610 0.3890 0.4640 0.0000 0.0000 0.6930 
OTIES 18,610 0.1340 0.0869 0.0909 0.1350 0.1670 
LOTIES 18,610 1.8460 1.1100 1.0990 1.7920 2.5650 
SIZE 18,610 21.7000 1.1530 20.8700 21.5400 22.3400 
ROA 18,610 0.0592 0.0462 0.0252 0.0483 0.0798 
LEV 18,610 0.4480 0.1980 0.2990 0.4530 0.6000 
PPE 18,610 0.2530 0.1750 0.1180 0.2210 0.3600 
INTAN 18,610 0.0420 0.0491 0.0103 0.0279 0.0542 
MB 18,610 3.6820 2.8150 1.8440 2.8230 4.5170 
GROWTH 18,610 0.2520 0.5690 0.0077 0.1430 0.3240 
AGE 18,610 8.1220 5.5040 3.0000 7.0000 12.0000 
INVENT 18,610 0.1640 0.1510 0.0647 0.1260 0.2100 
ROI 18,610 0.0074 0.0168 0.0000 0.0011 0.0073 
TACC 18,610 -0.0018 0.0723 -0.0434 -0.0055 0.0350 
CASH 18,610 0.1840 0.1320 0.0902 0.1480 0.2410 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for key variables used in our regression analysis. The sample period 
is 1998-2015. All the continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. See Appendix for complete 
variable definitions.  
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Table 4 Regression of tax avoidance on a firm’s partner ties to low-tax firms 
 
  Dependent Variable = ETR 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PTIES   -0.012***   
  (-3.059)  
LPTIES    -0.008***  
   (-3.042) 
OTIES -0.020  -0.011   
(-1.284)  (-0.707)  
LOTIES  -0.002  -0.001  
 (-1.263)  (-0.852) 
SIZE -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.006***  
(-2.866) (-2.848) (-2.848) (-2.895) 
ROA -0.398*** -0.398*** -0.398*** -0.400***  
(-9.288) (-9.305) (-9.290) (-9.240) 
LEV 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.052***  
(3.306) (3.310) (3.286) (3.301) 
PPE -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007  
(-0.477) (-0.471) (-0.497) (-0.495) 
INTAN 0.033 0.033 0.034 0.033  
(0.943) (0.942) (0.953) (0.930) 
MB -0.002** -0.001** -0.001** -0.002**  
(-2.420) (-2.420) (-2.403) (-2.433) 
GROWTH -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002  
(-0.964) (-0.956) (-0.992) (-0.972) 
AGE 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***  
(8.846) (8.824) (8.832) (8.801) 
INVENT 0.098*** 0.098*** 0.098*** 0.098***  
(6.272) (6.273) (6.259) (6.244) 
ROI -0.789*** -0.789*** -0.791*** -0.791***  
(-7.732) (-7.749) (-7.777) (-7.770) 
TACC -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.106*** -0.106***  
(-5.370) (-5.340) (-5.357) (-5.362) 
CASH 0.029** 0.029** 0.029** 0.029**  
(2.305) (2.334) (2.297) (2.325) 
Constant 0.225*** 0.223*** 0.224*** 0.228***  
(4.965) (4.909) (4.966) (5.015) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,610 18,610 18,610 18,610 
Adjusted R-squared 0.160 0.160 0.160 0.160 
This table presents the regression results of tax avoidance on firm’s shared partner ties to low-tax firms. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels for two-tailed tests. All regressions include 
year, industry and region fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered by firm and by year. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. See the Appendix for complete variable definitions. 
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Table 5 Learning Process: Effect of Partner Tenure at Low-tax Firms  
 Dependent Variable = ETR 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
PTIES long tenure -0.020***   
(-3.174)  
PTIES short tenure -0.007**  
 (-1.972)  
LPTIES long tenure  -0.010*** 
  (-3.560) 
LPTIES short tenure  -0.005***  
 (-2.679) 
OTIES -0.013  
 (-0.798)  
LOTIES  -0.001  
 (-0.919) 
SIZE -0.002 -0.003  
(-1.187) (-1.242) 
ROA -0.367*** -0.367***  
(-8.596) (-8.536) 
LEV 0.035** 0.036**  
(2.395) (2.460) 
PPE -0.016 -0.016  
(-1.132) (-1.127) 
INTAN 0.026 0.025  
(0.751) (0.727) 
MB -0.001** -0.001**  
(-2.294) (-2.351) 
GROWTH -0.001 -0.001  
(-0.649) (-0.621) 
AGE 0.003*** 0.003***  
(10.477) (10.416) 
INVENT 0.113*** 0.113***  
(7.112) (7.089) 
ROI -0.806*** -0.806***  
(-7.916) (-7.912) 
TACC -0.136*** -0.136***  
(-6.781) (-6.778) 
CASH 0.016 0.017  
(1.342) (1.392) 
Constant 0.172*** 0.176***  
(3.356) (3.410) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 18,610 18,610 
Adjusted R-squared 0.156 0.157 
F-test:  (L)PTIES long tenure 3.46* 2.91* 
= (L)PTIES short tenure p=0.0630 p=0.0878 
This table presents the regression results of tax avoidance on firm’s shared partner ties to low-tax firms based 
on whether the connected partners’ tenure in the low-tax firms is long or short. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels for two-tailed tests. All regressions include year, industry and 
region fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered by firm and by year. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. See the Appendix for complete variable definitions. 
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Table 6 Transfer Process: Effect of School Ties between Connected Partners and Top Executives 
 Dependent Variable = ETR 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
PTIES with school ties -0.047***   
(-2.585)  
PTIES without school ties -0.010*  
 (-1.708)  
LPTIES with school ties  -0.026*** 
  (-3.046) 
LPTIES without school ties  -0.007**  
 (-2.422) 
OTIES -0.016  
 (-1.010)  
LOTIES  0.000  
 (0.208) 
SIZE -0.006*** -0.006***  
(-2.638) (-2.711) 
ROA -0.418*** -0.419***  
(-9.599) (-9.619) 
LEV 0.050*** 0.050***  
(3.802) (3.790) 
PPE -0.005 -0.005  
(-0.339) (-0.336) 
INTAN 0.015 0.014  
(0.368) (0.349) 
MB -0.001 -0.001  
(-1.436) (-1.487) 
GROWTH -0.002 -0.002  
(-0.611) (-0.571) 
AGE 0.003*** 0.003***  
(7.345) (7.371) 
INVENT 0.120*** 0.120***  
(6.874) (6.866) 
ROI -0.706*** -0.707***  
(-6.674) (-6.673) 
TACC -0.117*** -0.117***  
(-5.200) (-5.214) 
CASH 0.039*** 0.039***  
(2.608) (2.600) 
Constant 0.244*** 0.246***  
(4.689) (4.747) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 10,260 10,260 
Adjusted R-squared 0.173 0.173 
F-test:  (L)PTIES with school ties 3.70* 4.43** 
= (L)PTIES without school ties p=0.0544 p=0.0355 
This table presents the regression results of tax avoidance on firm’s shared partner ties to low-tax firms based 
on whether the connected partners and top executives have school ties. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels for two-tailed tests. All regressions include year, industry and region fixed 
effects, and standard errors are clustered by firm and by year. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1 
and 99 percent. See the Appendix for complete variable definitions. 
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Table 7 Effect of change in a firm’s partner ties to low-tax firms 
on change in tax avoidance 
 
 Dependent Variable = △ETR 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
△PTIES -0.018**   
(-1.990)  
△PTIES with school ties  -0.096** 
  (-2.260) 
△PTIES without school ties  -0.020 
  (-1.516) 
△OTIES 0.015 0.011  
(0.537) (0.337) 
△SIZE -0.020** -0.015  
(-2.335) (-1.279) 
△ROA -0.511*** -0.576***  
(-6.877) (-5.207) 
△LEV 0.079** 0.134***  
(2.205) (2.902) 
△PPE 0.023 0.028  
(0.560) (0.544) 
△INTAN -0.065 -0.135  
(-0.605) (-0.866) 
△MB 0.001 -0.000  
(0.507) (-0.148) 
△GROWTH -0.007 -0.008  
(-1.343) (-1.139) 
AGE 0.000 0.001  
(0.496) (0.971) 
△INVENT 0.073 0.089  
(1.335) (1.200) 
△ROI -0.575*** -0.413**  
(-2.917) (-1.987) 
△TACC -0.080*** -0.131***  
(-2.661) (-2.912) 
△CASH 0.016 0.024  
(0.568) (0.571) 
Constant -0.005 -0.002  
(-0.310) (-0.086) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 3,381 1,908 
Adjusted R-squared 0.091 0.120 
This table presents the regression results using change specification. The regressions are based on a reduced 
sample where both of partners retain in the focal firms and no partner ties to low-tax firms in prior year. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels for two-tailed tests. All regressions include 
year, industry and region fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered by firm and by year. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. See the Appendix for complete variable definitions. 
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Table 8 Firm’s Audit Partner Ties to Low-Tax firms and Audit Fees 
 
         Dependent Variable = Ln(Fee) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
PTIES 0.024   
(1.294)  
PTIES with school ties  0.002 
  (0.024) 
PTIES without school ties  0.064** 
  (2.037) 
OTIES -0.034 -0.068  
(-0.658) (-0.940) 
SIZE 0.360*** 0.375***  
(28.938) (28.941) 
ROA 0.059 -0.006  
(0.359) (-0.030) 
LEV 0.105** 0.114**  
(2.007) (2.187) 
PPE -0.060 -0.074  
(-1.065) (-0.893) 
INTAN 0.388*** 0.368**  
(2.912) (2.350) 
MB 0.015*** 0.016***  
(4.751) (4.663) 
GROWTH -0.009 -0.016  
(-1.163) (-1.288) 
AGE -0.002 -0.002  
(-1.402) (-0.966) 
INVENT -0.213*** -0.274***  
(-3.888) (-3.750) 
ROI 0.633 0.287  
(1.557) (0.545) 
TACC -0.169*** -0.247***  
(-2.768) (-3.987) 
CASH -0.134** -0.113  
(-2.510) (-1.558) 
Constant 5.170*** 5.138***  
(20.130) (17.563) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 16,434 9,268 
Adjusted R-squared 0.573 0.594 
This table presents the regression results of auditing fee on firm’s shared partner ties to low-tax firms. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels for two-tailed tests. All regressions include year, 
industry and region fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered by firm and by year. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. See the Appendix for complete variable definitions. 
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Table 9 Audit Firm Size and Effect of Shared Partners Network Ties 
 
 Dependent Variable = ETR 
VARIABLES (1) Top 10 (2) Non-Top10 (3) Top 10 (4) Non-Top10 
PTIES 0.001 -0.022***    
(0.158) (-3.660)   
PTIES with school ties   -0.053** -0.046* 
   (-2.199) (-1.859) 
PTIES without school ties   0.004 -0.024*** 
   (0.400) (-2.723) 
OTIES 0.007 -0.002 -0.007 -0.009  
(0.273) (-0.115) (-0.207) (-0.467) 
SIZE -0.003 -0.007*** -0.006** -0.007**  
(-1.293) (-2.869) (-1.962) (-2.526) 
ROA -0.383*** -0.416*** -0.462*** -0.391***  
(-7.379) (-8.027) (-7.447) (-6.914) 
LEV 0.044*** 0.058*** 0.056*** 0.049***  
(2.973) (2.891) (2.971) (2.838) 
PPE -0.009 -0.007 0.006 -0.017  
(-0.512) (-0.390) (0.287) (-0.926) 
INTAN 0.029 0.037 -0.008 0.022  
(0.576) (0.964) (-0.143) (0.431) 
MB -0.002** -0.001 -0.002** -0.000  
(-2.454) (-1.488) (-1.973) (-0.354) 
GROWTH -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001  
(-0.688) (-0.975) (-0.750) (-0.204) 
AGE 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003***  
(5.945) (6.840) (4.542) (6.270) 
INVENT 0.126*** 0.081*** 0.132*** 0.108***  
(5.834) (4.920) (4.857) (5.174) 
ROI -0.645*** -0.898*** -0.569*** -0.798***  
(-4.478) (-7.413) (-3.366) (-6.379) 
TACC -0.128*** -0.087*** -0.131*** -0.098***  
(-3.652) (-3.294) (-3.808) (-3.440) 
CASH 0.019 0.044*** 0.041* 0.048**  
(1.179) (2.755) (1.904) (2.464) 
Constant 0.099 0.289*** 0.187** 0.306***  
(1.618) (5.402) (2.439) (4.532) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,885 10,725 4,728 5,532 
Adjusted R-squared 0.181 0.158 0.196 0.175 
This table presents the regression results of tax avoidance on firm’s shared partner ties to low-tax firms for 
Top 10 audit firms and Non-Top 10 audit firms. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 
levels for two-tailed tests. All regressions include year, industry and region fixed effects, and standard errors 
are clustered by firm and by year. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. See the 
Appendix for complete variable definitions. 
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Table 10 Endogeneity concerns: effect of a firm’s partner ties to high-tax firms on tax avoidance 
 
 Dependent Variable = ETR 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
HPTIES 0.001    
(0.152)   
HPTIES long tenure  0.002  
  (0.282)  
HPTIES short tenure  0.000  
  (0.060)  
HPTIES with school ties   -0.000 
   (-0.011) 
HPTIES without school ties   0.005 
   (0.635) 
HOTIES -0.011 -0.011 -0.005  
(-0.864) (-0.872) (-0.298) 
SIZE -0.006 -0.006 -0.005  
(-1.555) (-1.555) (-0.957) 
ROA -0.521*** -0.521*** -0.476***  
(-12.039) (-12.044) (-8.382) 
LEV 0.032** 0.032** 0.049**  
(2.069) (2.069) (2.270) 
PPE 0.012 0.012 0.024  
(0.714) (0.715) (1.058) 
INTAN 0.000 0.000 0.006  
(0.004) (0.004) (0.099) 
MB -0.001** -0.001** -0.002*  
(-1.986) (-1.985) (-1.747) 
GROWTH -0.002 -0.002 -0.003  
(-0.712) (-0.716) (-1.128) 
AGE 0.007 0.007 0.005  
(1.052) (1.048) (0.477) 
INVENT 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.100***  
(4.115) (4.116) (3.967) 
ROI -0.622*** -0.623*** -0.452***  
(-6.372) (-6.372) (-3.613) 
TACC -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.087***  
(-4.618) (-4.617) (-3.709) 
CASH 0.026* 0.026* 0.046**  
(1.732) (1.733) (2.288) 
Constant 0.299*** 0.299*** 0.275**  
(3.792) (3.791) (2.448) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,610 18,610 10,260 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.172 0.180 0.183 
This table presents the regression results after considering endogeneity concerns. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels for two-tailed tests. All regressions include year, industry and 
region fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered by firm and by year. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. See the Appendix for complete variable definitions. 
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Table 11 Alternative networks: common industry, geography and board interlocks 
 
  Dependent Variable = ETR 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
PTIES same ind -0.013*    
(-1.817)   
PTIES dif ind -0.011*   
 (-1.957)   
PTIES same reg  -0.014**  
  (-2.484)  
PTIES dif reg  -0.010*  
  (-1.669)  
PTIES interlocks   -0.034** 
   (-2.245) 
PTIES no interlocks    -0.011*** 
   (-2.796) 
OTIES -0.011 -0.011 -0.011  
(-0.708) (-0.690) (-0.727) 
SIZE -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***  
(-2.847) (-2.853) (-2.832) 
ROA -0.399*** -0.398*** -0.399***  
(-9.320) (-9.296) (-9.311) 
LEV 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.052***  
(3.283) (3.288) (3.282) 
PPE -0.007 -0.007 -0.007  
(-0.498) (-0.496) (-0.495) 
INTAN 0.034 0.034 0.033  
(0.953) (0.959) (0.938) 
MB -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**  
(-2.418) (-2.413) (-2.406) 
GROWTH -0.002 -0.002 -0.002  
(-0.996) (-0.994) (-0.990) 
AGE 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***  
(8.900) (8.867) (8.848) 
INVENT 0.098*** 0.098*** 0.098***  
(6.258) (6.257) (6.279) 
ROI -0.791*** -0.791*** -0.790***  
(-7.792) (-7.784) (-7.756) 
TACC -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.106***  
(-5.381) (-5.354) (-5.363) 
CASH 0.029** 0.029** 0.029**  
(2.299) (2.274) (2.317) 
Constant 0.224*** 0.224*** 0.223***  
(4.958) (4.964) (4.956) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,610 18,610 18,610 
Adjusted R-squared 0.160 0.160 0.160 
This table presents the regression results of tax avoidance on firm’s different types of shared partner ties to 
low-tax firms. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels for two-tailed tests. All 
regressions include year, industry and region fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered by firm and by 
year. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. See the Appendix for complete variable 
definitions. 
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Table 12 Alternative Measures for Tax Avoidance 
 
 Dependent Variable = Tax Avoidance Measures 
VARIABLES (1) ModETR (2) ETR3 (3) Cash ETR (4) ETR cashflow 
PTIES -0.010** -0.017** -0.014* -0.014* 
 (-2.011) (-2.034) (-1.722) (-1.749) 
OTIES -0.003 -0.028 -0.021 0.005 
 (-0.221) (-1.472) (-1.341) (0.295) 
SIZE 0.000 -0.006*** -0.004 -0.007***  
(0.031) (-3.425) (-1.626) (-3.585) 
ROA -0.863*** -0.381*** -0.986*** 0.595***  
(-14.223) (-7.788) (-12.678) (8.713) 
LEV -0.059*** 0.055*** 0.026* 0.041***  
(-3.446) (3.968) (1.844) (2.861) 
PPE -0.008 -0.032** 0.025* -0.056***  
(-0.599) (-1.995) (1.797) (-3.563) 
INTAN 0.031 0.087** 0.079* -0.002  
(0.938) (2.144) (1.673) (-0.042) 
MB 0.000 -0.001 0.002** -0.004***  
(0.725) (-1.326) (2.332) (-4.228) 
GROWTH -0.003 -0.000 -0.035*** 0.008*  
(-1.560) (-0.117) (-6.929) (1.883) 
AGE 0.000 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001**  
(0.447) (5.551) (5.102) (2.246) 
INVENT 0.085*** 0.122*** 0.112*** 0.093***  
(5.618) (5.980) (8.010) (4.292) 
ROI -0.722*** -0.820*** -0.653*** -0.908***  
(-6.589) (-5.882) (-6.866) (-5.983) 
TACC -0.083*** -0.241*** 0.021 1.663***  
(-5.569) (-7.394) (1.048) (19.561) 
CASH 0.038*** 0.036** 0.036* 0.017  
(3.228) (2.084) (1.684) (0.876) 
Constant -0.006 0.208*** 0.272*** 0.273***  
(-0.136) (4.853) (5.054) (5.550) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,610 14,466 15,057 14,325 
Adjusted R-squared 0.110 0.198 0.147 0.337 
This table presents the regression results for alternative measures of tax avoidance. The control variables are 
measured as three-year averages in Column (2) when ETR3 is the dependent variable. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels for two-tailed tests. All regressions include year, industry and 
region fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered by firm and by year. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. See the Appendix for complete variable definitions. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable  Definition  
Tax avoidance and control variables  
ETR Total tax expense scaled by pretax income. 
ModETR Modified ETR, measured as the firm’s effective tax rate (ETR) minus 
firm’s applicable tax rate (ATR)  
ETR3 Three-year ETR, measured as the sum of tax expense scaled by the sum 
of pre-tax income in years t to t+2 
Cash ETR Current income tax expense, minus end-of-the-year tax payable, plus 
start-of-the-year tax payable, divided by pretax income. 
ETRcash flow Total tax expense scaled by operating cash flows 
Ln(Fee) The natural logarithm of annual audit fees. 
SIZE Natural log of total assets at the end of year t 
ROA Pre-tax income scaled by total assets at the end of the year 
LEV Total liability scaled by total assets at the end of the year 
PPE Net PPE for year t scaled by the total assets at the end of the year t 
INTAN The sum of intangible assets scaled by the total assets at the end of the 
year t. 
MB Market to book ratio, measured as market value of equity divided by book 
value of equity.  
GROWTH Growth rate in sales, measured as the difference between sales and lagged 
sales divided by the lagged sales.  
AGE  The number of years since the firm was listed on the stock exchange. 
INVENT Inventory intensity, measured as the proportion of inventory to total 
assets.  
ROI Return on investment, measured as investment income to total assets.  
TACC Total accruals, measured as net income minus operating cash flow, 
dividend by total assets.  
CASH Cash holding, measured as cash and cash equivalents scaled by total 
assets. 
TOP10 An indicator variable that equals one if the company is audited by the Top 
10 accounting firm, zero otherwise. 
Partner ties variables  
TIES The total number of firms that the focal firm is connected to via shared 
individual audit partners. 
PTIES The number of low-tax firms the focal firm is connected to via shared 
individual audit partners scaled by the firm’s total partner ties 
(NTIES/TIES).  
LPTIES The natural logarithm of one plus the number of low-tax firms the focal 
firm is connected to via shared individual audit partners. 
PTIES long tenure The number of low-tax firms the focal firm is connected to via shared 
individual audit partners where the connected partners have long tenure 
in the low-tax firms, scaled by the firm’s total partner ties. We define long 
tenure as the partner tenure is greater than the median value of low-tax 
firms sample. 
PTIES short tenure The number of low-tax firms the focal firm is connected to via shared 
individual audit partners where the connected partners have short tenure 
in the low-tax firms, scaled by the firm’s total partner ties. We define 
short tenure as the partner tenure is less than the median value of low-tax 
firms sample. 
LPTIES long tenure The natural logarithm of one plus the number of low-tax firms the focal 
firm is connected to via shared individual audit partners where the 
connected partners have long tenure in the low-tax firms. 
LPTIES short tenure The natural logarithm of one plus the number of low-tax firms the focal 
firm is connected to via shared individual audit partners where the 
connected partners have short tenure in the low-tax firms. 
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PTIES with school ties The number of low-tax firms the focal firm is connected to via shared 
individual audit partners where the shared partner(s) and top executives 
(CEO, CFO or Chair) of focal firm have school ties, scaled by the firm’s 
total partner ties. 
PTIES without school ties  The number of low-tax firms the focal firm is connected to via shared 
individual audit partners where the shared partner(s) and top executives 
(CEO, CFO or Chair) of focal firm have no school ties, scaled by the 
firm’s total partner ties. 
LPTIES with school ties The natural logarithm of one plus the number of low-tax firms the focal 
firm is connected to via shared individual audit partners where the shared 
partner(s) and top executives (CEO, CFO or Chair) of focal firm have 
school ties. 
LPTIES without school ties  The natural logarithm of one plus the number of low-tax firms the focal 
firm is connected to via shared individual audit partners where the shared 
partner(s) and top executives (CEO, CFO or Chair) of focal firm have no 
school ties 
PTIES same ind The number of low-tax firms the focal firm is connected to via shared 
individual audit partners where the focal firm and its network firms are 
in the same industry, scaled by the firm’s total partner ties. 
PTIES dif ind The number of low-tax firms the focal firm is connected to via shared 
individual audit partners where the focal firm and its network firms are 
in the different industries, scaled by the firm’s total partner ties. 
PTIES same reg The number of low-tax firms the focal firm is connected to via shared 
individual audit partners where the focal firm and its network firms are 
in the same province location, scaled by the firm’s total partner ties. 
PTIES dif reg The number of low-tax firms the focal firm is connected to via shared 
individual audit partners where the focal firm and its network firms are 
in the different province locations, scaled by the firm’s total partner ties. 
PTIES interlocks The number of low-tax firms the focal firm is connected to via shared 
individual audit partners where the focal firm and low-tax firms have 
board interlocks, scaled by the firm’s total partner ties. 
PTIES no interlocks  The number of low-tax firms the focal firm is connected to via shared 
individual audit partners where the focal firm and low-tax firms have no 
board interlocks, scaled by the firm’s total partner ties. 
HPTIES The number of high-tax firms the focal firm is connected to via shared 
individual audit partners scaled by the firm’s total partner ties. 
HPTIES long tenure The number of high-tax firms the focal firm is connected to via shared 
individual audit partners where the connected partners have long tenure 
in the high-tax firms, scaled by the firm’s total partner ties.  
HPTIES short tenure The number of high-tax firms the focal firm is connected to via shared 
individual audit partners where the connected partners have short tenure 
in the high-tax firms, scaled by the firm’s total partner ties.  
HPTIES with school ties The number of high-tax firms the focal firm is connected to via shared 
individual audit partners where the shared partner(s) and top executives 
(CEO, CFO or Chair) of focal firm have school ties, scaled by the firm’s 
total partner ties. 
HPTIES without school ties The number of high-tax firms the focal firm is connected to via shared 
individual audit partners where the shared partner(s) and top executives 
(CEO, CFO or Chair) of focal firm have no school ties, scaled by the 
firm’s total partner ties. 
OTIES  The number of low-tax firms the focal firm is connected to via shared 
audit office scaled by the firm’s total audit office ties. 
LOTIES  The natural logarithm of one plus the number of low-tax firms the focal 
firm is connected to via shared audit office. 
HOTIES The number of high-tax firms the focal firm is connected to via shared 
audit office scaled by the firm’s total audit office ties. 
 
